Monitoring Ballot Counts

• Elections code 15350
• Elections code 14310-14313

• Elections code 15100-15112
• Elections code 15320-15321
  

• Elections code 15360

  (c) The elections official shall use either a random number
  generator or other method specified in regulations that shall be
  adopted by the Secretary of State to randomly choose the initial
  precincts, batches of vote by mail ballots, or direct recording
  electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally.

  (d) The manual tally shall be a public process, with the official
  conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice
  of the time and place of the manual tally and of the time and place
  of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording
  electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally prior
  to conducting the selection and tally.

  (e) The official conducting the election shall include a report on
  the results of the 1 percent manual tally in the certification of
  the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any
  discrepancies between the machine count and the manual tally and a
  description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In
  resolving any discrepancy involving a vote recorded by means of a
  punchcard voting system or by electronic or electromechanical vote
  tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern
  if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.

• California Code of Regulations, Chapter 8.1. Recounts
• http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/regulations/recount-reg-final-text-121709.pdf

Regulations

Important: Certification regulations lay out more rules about what records are to be kept, and rules for observers. See the bottom part of this page for more information about the systems in California.

Rules for observing

State law set some of the rules. State regulations, decided by the Secretary of State, determine some of them. The rest is left up to the county election officials.

The “Elections Observation Rights and Responsibilities – May 2012”, written by the California Secretary of State’s office in here [pdf format].

What to Do

• Locate the website for your county. You can find that here: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/county-elections-offices.
• Read the observers’ manual for your county.
  • You are not allowed to interfere with the count.
  • Generally you want to note what is going on, when. If you see something egregious, you might mention it to the person in charge – politely, and when they have a free moment.
  • Find out when and where counts are taking place.
  • Go and watch. Note any anomalies.
    • You willl learn that there is a rhythm to what they are doing. If there is a break in the rhythm – note that, and pay attention.

• Note the that the California Voter Bill of Rights, section 2300 states:
  • (9) (A) You have the right to ask questions about election procedures and observe the election process.
  • (9) (B) You have the right to ask questions of the precinct board and elections officials regarding election procedures and to receive an answer or be directed to the appropriate official for an answer. However, if persistent questioning disrupts the execution of their duties, the board or election officials may discontinue responding to questions.
  • (10) You have the right to report any illegal or fraudulent activity to a local elections official or to the Secretary of State’s office.

Resources

This [page] has links to excellent resources about monitoring elections.

Voting System Specific Regulations

These Regulations are important. I’ve included samples of regulations for LA and Sequoia to give you an idea of what goes into them. They were mostly written by Debra Bowen.

Diebold/Premier

These counties include Fresno, Marin, Placer, San Diego, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara

Diebold rules are [here]

ES&S

These counties include Contra Costa, Sacramento, Stanislaus, Solano

ES&S Rules are [here]

Hart Intercivic

These counties are Orange, San Mateo and Yolo

Hart Intercivic rules are [here].

Dominion

Dominion Democracy Sutie rules are [here].

DFA Mark-A-Vote (Sonoma)

DFA Mark-A-Vote rules are [here].

Sequoia

These counties include Alameda, Kern, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Tulare, Ventura

• Optech Insight, AVC Edge 5.0, and Optech 400C, California Procedures
• Withdrawal Of Approval Of Sequoia Voting Systems
  • 18. Within 60 days of the original issuance of this document on August 3, 2007, the vendor, working with elections officials, must develop and submit to the Secretary of State for approval, specific detailed requirements and Use Procedures for vote results auditing and reconciliation, review of audit logs and retention of election documentation to validate vote results and detect unauthorized manipulation of vote results, including, but not limited to:
    • Precinct level ballot accounting;
    • Identification of abnormal voting patterns on VeriVote audit trails; and
    • Reconciliation of variances between electronic and manual audit vote results.
  • 21. Elections officials are required to conduct a 100% manual tally, by the process described in Elections Code section 15360, of the electronic results tabulated on each DRE machine in use on Election Day. Notice to the public of this manual tally may be combined with the notice required by any other manual tally required in this order or by Elections Code section 15360.
  • 22. Each polling place must be equipped with a method or log in a format specified by the Secretary of State after consultation with elections officials to record all problems and issues with the voting equipment in the polling place as reported by voters or observed by poll workers. Such records must include the following information for each event:
    • Date and time of occurrence;
    • Voter involved, if any;
    • Equipment involved;
    • Brief description of occurrence;
    • Actions taken to resolve issue, if any; and
    • Elections official(s) who observed and/or recorded the event

    All such event logs or reports must be made available to the public for inspection and review upon request. Prior to or concurrent with the certification of the election, the elections official must submit a report to the Secretary of State of all reported problems experienced with the voting system and identifying the actions taken, if any, to resolve the issues.

  • 24. Elections officials must develop appropriate security procedures for use when representatives of qualified political parties and bona fide associations of citizens and media associations, pursuant to their rights under Elections Code section 15004, check and review the preparation and operation of vote tabulating devices and attend any or all phases of the election. The security procedures must permit representatives to observe at a legible distance the contents of the display on the vote tabulating computer or device. This requirement may be satisfied by positioning an additional display monitor or monitors in a manner that allows the representatives to read the contents displayed on the vote tabulating computer or device while also observing the vote tabulating computer or device and any person or persons operating the vote tabulating computer or device.
  • 32. Any jurisdiction using this voting system shall, prior to such use in each election, file with the California Secretary of State a copy of its Election Observer Panel
    plan.

Los Angeles

• Procedures Required for Use of the InkaVote Optical Scan Voting System AKA InkaVote Procedures
  • 3.6 Tally Processing (Semi-Final Official Canvass)
  • 3.8 Official Canvass Processing
    • 3.8.1 Canvassing Provisional Ballots
    • 3.8.2 Canvassing Precincts
    • 3.8.4 Canvassing VBM Voter Ballots
    • 3.8.5 Canvassing Write-In Votes
    • 3.8.6 Canvass Tally Updates
  • 3.9 Manual 1% Recount Tally
  • 3.10 Tally Updates (update computer counts)
  • 4.0 Vote Determination
    • 4.1 Valid Votes
    • 4.2 Invalid Votes
  • 5.0 Post Election Procedures
    • 5.1 Checking Unused Ballots
    • 5.2 Vote Recorders
    • 5.3 Retention of Election Materials
    • 5.4 Adherence to Established Procedures
    • 5.5 Manual Recount
  • 6.0 Election Security Provisions
    • 6.1 Ballot Counting System Security
    • 6.2 Audit Trails
    • 6.3 Statistical Ballot Data Required
  • 7.0 Certification And Reporting Requirements
    • 7.3 Election Observer Panel
    • 7.7 Preparation of Specific Written Procedures
      Each elections official shall prepare specific written procedures for each phase, step and procedure in the preparation, operation of polling places, vote counting and official canvasses of elections. Written procedures must also include instructions to precinct officials regarding proper handling of absent voter and provisional voter ballots as well as a description of procedures used to manually recount ballots pursuant to Elections Code section 15600.
• LA:
  Additional Conditions On Use Of The Microcomputer Tally System
  • 5
    • (A) Los Angeles County elections officials shall conduct a Logic and Accuracy (L&A) test on each card reader being used in the election before and after each official tally run. If the pre-run L&A test fails for any reader, that reader shall not be used for the official tally run. If the post-run L&A fails for any reader, all precincts run through that reader will be deleted from the central tally results and reprocessed through a different reader.
    • (B) To further verify the accuracy of the initial machine count and to help ensure that any potential miscounts are detected and corrected, Los Angeles County elections officials must include in the 1 % manual tally required by Elections Code section 15360 at least one randomly selected precinct from each card reader used in the Election Night tally. For any card reader used in the Election Night tally that is not represented in the initial random selection conducted to comply with Elections Code section 15360, Los Angeles County must conduct an additional random selection among the precincts that were counted by each unrepresented card reader and add the randomly selected precinct or precincts to the sample to be manually tallied pursuant to Elections Code section 15360.
    • (C) If any variance between the semifinal official canvass results and the manual tally results is discovered in the completion of the 1 % manual tally required under 5(B) above, elections officials must document and disclose each variance and take the following steps to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election results:
      • (1) Elections officials must calculate a variance percentage for each contest by dividing the total number of variances found in the 1 % sample by the total ballots cast in the 1 % sample for that contest as counted in the manual tally (not including under- and overvotes). A “variance” means each difference between the card reader result and manual tally result for each measure or office. A variance does not include a difference between the card reader result and manual tally result that is not attributable to card reader miscount.
      • (2) Elections officials must determine whether a “significant variance” -one where the variance percentage is greater than 10% (one-tenth) of the overall margin of victory percentage – exists for each contest. The margin of victory shall be based on semifinal official canvass results, as defined in Elections Code section 353.5. The “margin of victory” is the difference between the first place and the second place candidate in a given contest. For a contest involving a measure, the “margin of victory” is the difference between the “Yes” and the “No” votes. For a multi-winner contest, the “margin of victory” is the difference between the candidate who had just enough votes to win a seat and the ncxt candidate below. For example, for a race with three open seats, the margin of victory would be the difference between the third and fourth place candidates.
      • (3) If no significant variance is found, then elections officials shall include the precinct results in the official tally in accordance with Elections Code section 15360. Ifa significant variance is found, then election officials shall take the following steps:
        • (a) If at least three precincts tallied by the same card reader were part
          of the initial 1% random sample, then go to step (4).

        • (b) If less than three precincts tallied by the same card reader were part of the initial 1% random sample, then elections officials shall do the following:
          • (a) If at least three precincts tallied by the same card reader were part of the initial 1% random sample, then go to step (4).
          • (b) If less than three precincts tallied by the same card reader were part of the initial 1% random sample, then elections officials shall do the following:
            • i. Randomly select additional precincts tallied by the same card
              reader to reach a total of three.

            • ii. Manually tally the additional precincts.
            • iii. Go to step (4) below.
      • (4) Calculate variance percentages for each contest based on the combined results from the three or more precincts tallied by the same card reader that were part of the initial 1 % random sample. If no significant variance is found, then elections officials shall include the precinct results in the official tally in accordance with Elections Code section 15360. (Stop) If a significant variance is found, then go to step (5).
      • (5) Delete all precincts that were run through that reader on Election Night from the central tally results.
      • (6) Reprocess them through a different reader on which no significant variance was discovered during the initial manual tally process.
      • (7) Compare the earlier manual tally results of the three (or more) precincts
        with the new machine count results for those precincts.
        If no significant variance is found, then elections officials shall include
        the precinct results in the official tally in accordance with Elections
        Code section 15360. (Stop)
        If a significant variance is found, then go back to step (5) and reprocess
        the results through a different reader on which no significant variance
        was discovered during the initial manual tally process. Elections
        officials may repeat this process if significant variances are discovered
        again, but only if there are additional card readers available on which no
        significant variance was discovered during the initial manual tally
        process.

      • (8) If there are no additional card readers available on which to conduct
        steps (5)-(7), then elections officials shall begin a manual tally of the precincts that were run through that reader on Election Night. The
        manual tally shall be continued until there is no longer a significant
        variance or all ballots have been manually tallied.
    • (D) Elections officials shall keep a log to record the MTS Card Reader Verification
      Requirements process, including the results of each round of manual tallying for
      each precinct included in the sample, how variances were resolved, and details of
      any actions taken that are contrary to written protocols. The log must be made
      available to the public.

    • (E) To avoid manually counting the same precinct under two separate processes, if a precinct has been randomly selected for a manual tally under these requirements, elections officials may use any manual tally results for the precinct obtained as part of either of the following:
      • (1) The 1% manual tally conducted pursuant to Elections Code section 15360; or
      • (2) The Post Election Manual Tally Requirements, which only apply in contests where the margin of victory is less than one half of one percent (0.5%).